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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REID E. JENSEN, 
-vs-
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
CONiUE GAIL THOMAS, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
---0000000---
CASE NO. 14838 
---0000000---
APPELLANT'S BRIEF OF NEWLY UNCOVERED CASES 
Pursuant to Rule 75(p) (3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
respondent submits the attached pages of newly uncovered cases for 
~sertion in the reply brief of appellant, all cases applying to 
POINT IV of appellant's reply brief. 
DATED this ,-( day of ~;_)_1 ·-;-~ ._1 19 77. 
By k?t I .~ i!R 
ROBERT J. DEBRY / 
Attorney for Appellani( 
2040 East 4800 South, #203 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
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The case of Ric~e~t v. Hayes, 473 S.W. 2d 446 (Arkansas 1971) 
is also instructive. In Rickett, an action for medical malpractice, 
the lower court ruled that the plaintiff could not, prior to trial, 
depose the defendant's expert witness about his opinion as to whether 
or not the defendant had met the standard of care required of 
doctors in that locality. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court 
held that such denial constituted reversible error and the case was 
remanded for a new trial. Concerning the pre-trial discovery of 
the opinion of an expert witness the court stated at 448-51: 
We have recognized the importance of cross-
examination of an adverse witness not only to 
test his credibility but also in an attempt to 
wring disclosures which might modify or explain 
his testimony on direct examination or bring it 
into a perspective which might present a view 
more favorable to the cross-examiner. 
Planning effective cross-examination of adversary 
witnesses is one of a trial lawyer's most import-
ant responsibilities in preparation for trial, 
particularly when the witnesses are experts. See 
Allen v. Arkansas State Highway Commission, supra; 
United States v. 23.76 Acres, 32 F.R.D. 593, 
(D.C. Md. 1963). Handicaps to attempting full 
cross-examination of an expert witness without 
pre-trial discovery of his opinion with its 
supporting data and theoretical basis are discussed 
by Professor Friedenthal in "Discovery and Use of· 
an Adverse Party's Expert Information," 14 Stanford 
Law Review 455, 485 et seq. The desirability of 
permitting discovery of adverse expert witnesses 
to enable advance preparation for effective cross-
examination is well stated in the Advisory Committee's 
Notes to Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Relating to Discovery at 48 F.R.D. 487. 
Depositions taken under the applicable statute may be 
used for the express purpose of contradicting or 
impeaching the testimony of the deponent at the trial 
of the case. Ark. Stat. Ann. 28-348 (d) (1). 
11 a 
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Decisions upholding limitations on discovery of 
an expert witness, particularly where there was 
a foreclosure of inquiry as to the expert's opinions 
and conclusions, are abundant and might well support 
an order such as that entered here in the ordinary 
case. Still, there are recognized exceptions to the 
otherwise proper limitation of discovery of the 
conclusions of an adverse party's expert where the 
evidence is indispensable to a determination of a 
material issue and would be otherwise unavailable. 
Leininger v. Swadner, 279 Minn. 251, 156 N.W.2d 254 
(1968); United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th 
Cir. 1968). An entirely different situation obtains, 
however, when the expert's testimony pertains to the 
very crux of the issue to be determined on trial. 
United States v. Meyer, supra; United States v. 
364.82 Acres of Land, 38 F.R.D. 411 (D.C.Cal. 1965). 
For example, in an eminent domain proceeding, the 
critical issue is usually the amount of just 
compensation, and evidence on that issue generally 
consists of the opinions of opposing experts and 
the factual and theoretical bases upon which they 
rest. In United States v. Meyer, supra, it was held 
that a landowner was entitled to a disclosure of the 
condemnor's appraisers' opinions and their factual 
and theoretical foundations to enable him to fairly 
evaluate the respective claims for settlement purposes, 
determine the real area of dispute, narrow the actual 
issues, avoid surprise and prepare adequately for cross-
examination and rebuttal. In so holding, the court 
there recognized that the weight to which an appraiser's 
opinion testimony is entitled rests upon the validity 
of the appraiser's premises, procedures, and theories, 
the soundness of his factual determinations, the methods 
he has followed and the formulae he has applied. The 
court in Meyer felt that full pre-trial disclosure of 
the opinions of the experts was essential to the 
accomplishment of the basic purposes of the discovery 
rules, and that the opinions of these appraisers and 
their basis were information that could not be obtained 
from any other source. The same effect, see Franks v. 
National Dairy Products Corporation, 41 F.R.D. 234 (D.C. 
Texas 1966), aff'd 414 F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1969); 
United States v. 23.76 Acres, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D.C. 
Md. 1963). The propriety of pretrial examination of an 
adverse expert in such cases for the purpose of trial 
cross-examination is consistent with the rationale of 
llickfllan v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 
451 (1347) and the ideal of liberal construction there 
express~d. A similar result has been reached in per-
mitting discovery of certain reports of an adverse party's 
expert in a patent infringement case as part of the facts 
involved. E. I. DuPont De Nemours Co. v. Phillips tn ........... Pe_t_r_o_l~eum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416 (D.C. Del. 1959). 
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Thus, in a situation where it mioht be calculated 
that the particular expert's tesfimony would carry 
considerable weight, appellant's attorneys may well 
have been severely handicapped, as he claimed on the 
threshold of the trial, in conducting a cross-examina-
tion of this witness, which might be the only effective 
means of minimizing the weioht to be given to his 
testimony by the jury. Because of this, the trial 
court's order was unduly restrictive. This conclusion 
is in harmony with our longstanding commitment to the 
liberal interpretation of the discovery act necessary 
to accomplish its salutary purposes. See Bower v. 
Murphy, 247 Ark. 238, 444 S.W.2d 883; Arkansas State 
Highway Commission v. Stanley, 234 Ark. 428, 353 S.W.2d 
173, 4 A.L.R.3d 749. 
Even though appellant's attorneys conducted an 
apparently extensive cross-examination of Dr. Stuckey, 
we cannot say that the error in unduly restricting the 
scope of discovery inquiry was harmless in view of what 
we have said. We could only speculate whether the 
cross-examination would have been more effective if 
appellant had not been limited in his discovery. We 
presume that error is prejudicial unless we can say-with 
assurance that the record discloses that it is harmless. 
Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Parks, 240 Ark. 719, 
401 S.W.2d 732, 26 A.L.R.3d 775; Allen v. Arkansas State 
Highway Commission, 247 Ark. 857, 448 S.W.2d 27. This we 
cannot do. 
As in Ricketts, the expert opinion testimony here went to the 
heart of plaintiff's case. This is so because the only real issues 
to be tried were whether Thomas caused Jensen's visual problems 
and, if so, how much Jensen should be paid to compensate him for 
his injuries. It was, therefore mandatory that Jensen's attorney be 
furewarned as to Dr. Hershgold's opinion as to causation, so that 
counsel could prepare for cross-examination. Jensen's counsel, 
however' was given no forewarning but instead learned of Dr. Hershgcild' , 
testimony for the first time as it was being given to the jury in 
open court. Under these facts, as in Ricketts, the only fair way 
1 l I,...\ 
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to handle the problem is to grant a new trial. Appellant's 
respectfully request that a new trial be granted. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that / ~ / on the · day of._;/. ; 1977, two 
- -; 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Appella~t's Brief of 
Newly Uncovered Cases were delivered to Stephen Nebeker, attorney 
for respondent, 400 Deseret Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111. 
• • I / 
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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the lower court's refusal to grant a new 
trial. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Jensen sued Thomas for negligence. The jury returned a verdict 
"no cause of action". Jensen moved for a new trial pursuant to Rule 
59 (a) (3) on the grounds of surprise. The lower court denied Jensen's 
motion for a new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Jensen seeks a new trial. 
FACTS 
1. On January 16, 1974, Jensen and Thomas were involved in an 
auto collision (Record 295). 
2. The proximate cause of the collision was Thomas' negligence 
I Record 176 ) . 
3. A few hours after the collision, Jensen experienced a type of 
temporary blindness known as Transcient Ischemic Attacks (hereinafter 
T.I.A.) (Record 290-91). Jensen had never expereinced any T. I.A. attack 
prior to the collision (Record 302). The frequency of the T. I.A. attac 
has gradually increased from the time of the accident to the trial 
I Record 30 3-304). 
4
· At trial the only issue presented to the jury was whether or 
not the T. I. A. was caused by the collision (Record 176) · 
-1-
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5. 
of action" 
The jury returned a verdict for Thomas 
(R. 188). 
"no :. 
6. Jensen made a timely motion for a new tria; 
1 
upon surprise (R. 227). The lower court denied Jensen's. 
for a new trial (R. 263). 
POINT ONE 
COUNSEL FOR THOMAS INJECTED SURPRISE TESTIMONY 
INTO THE TRIAL 
1. During the pretrial discovery, Jensen advis; 
Thomas that two theories would be presented at trial. ::: 
that the auto caused Transcient Ischemic Attacks or "min: 1 
strokes". Second, that the auto accident caused Raynaucs 
disease (R. 95, 96). 
2. On March 2 5, 19 7 6, Jensen served the followc 
interrogatory on Thomas: "Identify each expert witness ;·: 
intend to call at the trial of the above-entitled matter, 
! 
identify by name, address, specialty, and the basic subst::, 
I 
of the said witnesses testimony (R. 74). 
3. In response to the interrogatory, Thomas sta:, 
that Dr. Edward Hershgold and Dr. Reed Clegg would be cal~' I 
as defendant's expert witnesses (R. 85). Thomas further 
1 · · ted to t)e stated that Hershgold's testimony would be imi 
. . d Rayna': 
causal relationship between the auto collision an ' 
226. 
disease (R. -- two un-numbered sheets between Record 
Record 227; also R. 257). 
4. After the deposition of Hershgold 
Jensen informed Thomas that Jensen ~ 3 n· 
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relationship between the auto collision and the Raynauds; and 
that Jensen would proceed on the sole theory that the auto 
collision caused the T.I.A. (R. 98 and 99, also R. 258). 
5. Jensen further notified Thomas that Dr. Rich and 
Dr. van Dyke would testify for Jensen on the causal relationship 
between the auto collision and the T.I.A. (R. 98). 
6. Shortly before the trial, Thomas notified Jensen of 
a last minute expert witness who would testify on the causal 
relationship between the auto accident and the T.I.A. The 
last minute witness was named Dr. Jarcho (R. 258). 
7. Jensen advised Thomas that Van Dyke's (Jensen's 
expert on T.I.A.) testimony would be given at trial by 
deposition (Van Dyke deposition p. 3). 
8. It was further stipulated by counsel that Jarcho'~ 
(Thomas' expert on T.I.A.) testimony would be given at trial 
by deposition (R. 258 §8). 
9. In summary the pretrial discovery fully disclosed 
that Jensen had dropped his claim for a causal relationship 
between the collision and Raynauds. The only issue for trial 
was the causal relation between the collision and T.I.A. Thomas 
was committed to present the Jarcho deposition on the T.I.A. 
issue. Jensen was committed to present the Van Dyke deposition 
on the T.I.A. issue. 
10. Notwithstanding the detailed and extensive pretrial 
discovery and pretrial stipulations discussed above, Thomas 
called Dr. Hershgold as a witness even though Raynauds was not 
-3-
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an issue. Notwithstanding express representations to ... 
~.I~ 
contrary (R. two un-numbered sheets between R. 226 _. 
Thomas began to interrogate Hershgold on matters direct: 
related to T. I.A. (R. 234 - R. 238). 
11. Jensen made a timely objection to the sur:: 
testimony (R. 238) and advised the court that: 
MR. DeBRY: You (counsel for Thomas) indic: 
that Dr. Hershgold would be a witness, and thero 
at our expense, our time, we took Dr. Hershgo1:· 
deposition and we asked by Interrogatory who •;c. 
intended to call. And you indicated by Answe~: 
Interrogatory that you intended to call Dr. Her: 
on the issue of Raynauds. And, therefore, we we· 
to the time -- we went to the expense to interrc 
him on that issue. Now, that issue has n~m~ 
brought up in this case. And we are completely· 
by surprise and completely prejudiced. And ~he:; 
no way we haven 't had a chance to interview or'. 
a deposition of this witness beyond the scope c' 
Raynaud's problem. 
And if the interrogation goes beyond the s:: 
of the Raynaud' s problem, it is no issue in th1: 
case (R. at 239). 
12. Jensen also moved that the testimony be str. 
(R. 241 and R. 242). 
13. 1 d and Hee' Jensen's objections were overru e 
was permitted to continue with the surprise testimony(?.. 
14. Thereafter Thomas did not publish the Jarc 
deposition but relied solely on the surprise testirrony :: 
Hershgold. 
POINT TWO 
r" 
THE SURPRISE TESTIMONY OF DR. HERSHGO~ 
PREJUDICIAL AND DAMAGING TO ~:?!_ 
1. . 1 di scn"er", By reason of the pretria · · · 
was led to 
. y O!l believe that Thomas' only testirnon Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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.. 
be from the Jarcho deposition (Point One, supra). 
2. The Jarcho testimony on the issue of causation 
was completely innocuous. For example, the critic~l part of 
the Jarcho deposition was as follows: 
Q. Based upon your examination and upon 
the history which he gave you and 
upon your opinion as a neurologist, 
first of all have you come to any 
conclusion about this particular 
visual disturbance based upon a 
reasonable medical certainty? 
A. I haven't come to a conclusion but I 
can, if you wish, discuss possible 
causes which I have considered. 
(Deposition of Jarcho p. 15 and 16). 
3. Indeed the Jarcho deposition was probably not even 
admissable on the issue of causal relationship between the 
collision and the T. I.A. Moore v. Denver & Rio Grande Railro<' 
4 Utah 2d 255; 292 P.2d 849 (1956). 
4. At trial, Jensen's expert gave testimony (by 
deposition) that the auto collision was to a reasonable 
medical certainty the cause of the T.I.A. (R. 376). 
5. In summary, prior to the surprise testimony of 
Hershgold, Thomas had no expert testimony on causation of 
T.I.A. On the other hand Jensen's expert gave very persuasive 
testimony on the causation of the T.I.A. 
6. The surprise testimony of Hershgold immediately 
changed the entire complexion of the trial. With absolutely 
no forewarning, Hershgold gave extensive testimony on 
causation of T.I,A. 
-5-
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First, Hershgold gave extensive testimony desc:. 
how T. I.A. is caused by hardening of the arteries. In'.: 
Hershgold stated that, ". . . the most common cause, bv, 
of Transcient Ischemic Attacks is first the h roug ening c' 
the blood vessel which comes from hardening of the arter 
(R. 2 36). Hershgold then went on to testify that he fo.; 
Jensen to have hardening of the arteries (R. 237-238). 
implied argument was that hardening of the arteries not: 
auto collision caused the T. I.A. Then on redirect exam1:1 
Hershgold gave his expert opinion that the T. I.A. was ca: 
by hardening of the arteries and not by the auto collisJC 
(R. 251-252). 
8. Moreover, the surprise testimony of Dr. Her: 
was an express violation of Rule 26 (e) (1) (B) which states 
"A party is under a duty to ;easonably supplement his re:: 1 
with respect to any question directly addressed to · · ·: 
identity of each person expected to be called as an expe:-
witness at trial, and the subject matter on which he i:.J 
to testify". (Emphasis added) 
POINT THREE 
PLAINTIFF HAS NO PRACTICAL REMEDY TO SURPRISE TEST~ 
A NEW TRIAL 
A lawyer's "first line of defense" to surprise 
at the trial. 
testimony is to make appropriate objections 
that that remedy is However, upon analysis it is apparent 
more illusory than real. 
c·: 
Merely making the objection ' 
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more harm than good. The jury resents the objecting party 
because they feel he is trying to hide something. Moreover, 
the fact that an objection is made tends to focus the 
jury's attention on the prejudicial material. As the 
supreme Court in Alabama has noted in a similar case, 
"To insist upon and argue such a matter 
at that time would tend to magnify the fact 
in the estimation of the jury. It would, 
therefore, seem appropriate to wait and make 
a motion for a new trial if the decision is 
adverse and have that as one of the grounds". 
Parker v. Williams, 99 So. 2d 210 (Ala. 1957) 
After the surprise testimony gets in, the opposing 
lawyer is faced with the problem of whether or not to cross 
examine. If there is no cross-examination, the jury might 
infer that the opposing lawyer concedes the truthfulness 
of the testimony. On the other hand, if the opposing lawy,,r 
attemps a cross-examination, he is faced with the problem 
of cross-examining an expert witness without any preparation. 
In short, surprise testimony may theoretically be 
cured by appropriate objection and instruction from the 
court at the time of trial; however, as a practical matter 
such devices are ineffective and the only true remedy is a 
new trial. 
POINT FOUR 
RELEVANT STATUTES A."JD CASE LAW EXPRESSLY PROVIDE FOR A NEW 
TRIAL IN THIS TYPE OF SITUATION 
Rule 59(a) (3) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
provides that a new trial may be granted for accident or surpris 
-7-
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which ordinary prudence could not have guarded . 
against. 
The Utah Supreme Court has reviewed the statutes on onl .. 
few occasions, Snell v. Cisler, 1 Utah 298 (187 6);~ 
L. & I. R. Co. v. Jones, 51 Utah 62 (1917), Stewart Minin: 
Co. v. Coulter, 3 Utah 174 (1881), Flinders v. Hunt, 6~ 
314 (1922), and none of these seem to be in point here. 
However, other courts when faced with the situation of 
surprise testimony have not hesitated to order a new tri: 
if the evidence introduced was prejudicial. 
The most recent case is Reis v. McComb, 545 P.1c 
(Ariz. 1976). In that case the plaintiff claimed to have 1 
given a $4,000.00 promissory note signed by the defendan: 
At the trial the defendant suddenly introduced the defens: 
that he was in California on the date the note was made. 
A friend also testified introducing an appointment book•' 
showed that the two had been together in California on th! 
day in question. In that case the Court made particular 
note that "discovery indicated nothing to appellant about· 
unusual twist which McComb' s story would take. Througho': 
his deposition, answers to interrogatories, and his answe: 
to request for admissions McComb denied knowing anything 
ellant 's 
about the note. No supplementary answers to app 
Cone 1 uded that thi: interrogatories were filed. The court 
f Surprise" and gran:· was a "most agregious demonstration o 
a new trial. 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
--
In the case of Walker v. Distler, 296 P.2d 452 
(Ida. 1956), the plaintiff brought a malpractice suit against 
ter physician for injuries allegedly suffered as a result of 
his administration of an anaesthetic. At the trial the 
physician presented a defense that emergency conditions 
required the administration of an anaesthetic. In order 
to prove the emergency condition, the physician introduced 
results of the plaintiff's urine tests without forwarning the 
plaintiff. Based on surprise the trial court ordered a 
new trial and the Supreme Court affirmed. 
In Whitfield v. Debrincat, 64 P.2d 960 (Cal. 1937) 
a witness gave surprise testimony. In affirming a new trial 
the appellate court stated that, 
"All of the cases ,1qree l at if a witness 
suddenly changes . : . or fails to testify 
in accordance with his previous assurances, 
by reason of any fact or occurrence of 
which neither the witness nor the party 
calling him is in any measure responsible 
that a new trial will be granted 
ex debito justitiae." 
POINT FIVE 
IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL AT THE TIME OF 
SURPRISE 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not require 
counsel to make a motion for mistrial when confronted with 
the surprise testimony in order to later qualify for a new 
trial. 
-9-
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Cases from some foreign jurisdictions h ave so:,. 
times stated that one seeking a new tr· 1 b ia ased on sur·· ,. 
must move for a mistrial when confronted wi.· th th e surpr: 
testimony. There are no Utah cases on poi.· nt. H owever, 
the best reasoned cases hold that it is not necessary:: 
move for a new trial at the time of surprise. The case 
Whitfield v. Debrincat, supra, specifically addressed t:. 
point and concluded that "the bell had rung, and could:.: 
be unrung". Likewise in Reis v. McComb, supra, and Wak 
v. Distler, supra, it does not appear that the moveant :" 
motion for mistrial at the time of trial. 
In Maher v. Roisner, 57 N.W. 2d 810 (Minn. 195: 
plaintiff's counsel dropped an envelope containing newsfa: 
advertisements which the court had ruled inadmissable. :· 
was clear that the jury saw some of the ads as counsel;:: 
up. Although defense counsel did not move for a mistria: 
even object at the time, the Minnesota Supreme Court orde: 
a new trial. "Where the misconduct was a fundamental an( 
manifest as that exhibited here, we feel that the new w:. 
was not to discipline counsel for any misconduct, but ~a: 
necessary to correct the extreme prejudice that the defe:.: 
had suffered. 
· 1 uni0!1_, 88 so. And, in McLemore v. Internati.ona ~ 
the words 
2d 170 (Ala. 1956), defendant's counsel wrote 
"equality" and "liberty" on the courtroom floor 
with cha'. 
and then referred to them during his argument. 
ld that thl; 
there was no objection at the time, it was he 
. w trial. 
conduct was prejudicial, and required a ne 
• 
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POINT SIX 
THE LOWER COURTS REFUSAL TO GRA."JT A NEW TRIAL WAS AN ABUSE 
OF DISCRETION 
It is sometimes said that the power to grant or 
deny a new trial rests generally within the sound discretion 
of the trial court. Nevertheless it is clear that the 
Supreme Court will review any abuse of discretion exercised 
by the lower court. Salt Lake City v. Anderson, 148 P.2d 
346, 106 Utah 350. 
The term "abuse of discretion" should not be a tool 
to mechanically "rubber stamp" the conduct of the lower court 
judge. Indeed it has been held that the phrase "abuse of 
discretion" does not cast any reflection upon the lower court 
judge, but indicates that the appellate court is simply 
of the opinion that there was a commission of error in the la1 
and the circumstances. Media v. District Court for Otero 
County, 493 P.2d 617 (Colo. 1972). 
In weighing the "abuse of discretion" of the lower 
court, this court should also consider the policy considera-
tions of this case. When judges and lawyers in Utah analyze 
whether a new trial is appropriate for surprise they will 
read two things. They will read the statute (Rule 59(a} (3)) 
and they will read this case. The policy question is simply 
this. If the facts here do not compel a new trial under the 
statute, where then is the line. Shouldn't a lwayer in Utah 
be able to protect himself from surprise testimony by 
thorough discovery and preparation? 
............. __________ _,.;;.1u1.;;..... __________________ _ 
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Mr. Jensen deserves a new trial under the statut! 
but even more, lawyers and judges in Utah need the guid· 
of this court in how to fairly prepare and conduct their 
trials. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant improperly injected surprise testimony 
into the trial. The surprise testimony was highly prej' 
and forced plaintiff's counsel to cross-examine an expert 
witness without any prior notice or preparation. The l 
court erred in not granting a new trial pursuant to Rule 
59 (a) (3) of the Utah Rules 
DATED this :3J_ day of 
Procedure. 
This is to certify that I mailed a true copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to Stephen Nebeker, attorn~ 
for defendant, at his address of 400 Deseret Building, 
, , I ,~ 
Salt Lake City, Utah, this__/,,;Jaay of - '//,Al·~il911i 
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